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acre limitation, it follows that the conclusion reached by the
majority that the contract here involved deprives certain
landowners within the plaintiff irrigation district of vested
rights without due process of law and without just compensation is equally unsound and unsupported.
For the reasons hereinabove stated I would reverse the
judgment.
The petition of defendant and appellant for a rehearing
was denied Pebruary l!l, l!l57. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and
'l'raynor, .J., were of the opinion that the petition should be
granted.

[Sac. No. 6489.

In Bank. Jan. 24, 1957.]

MADERA IRRIGATION DISTRICT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ALL PEHSONS, etc., Defendants; JOHN
HUMPHREYS et al., Hespondents; THE PEOPLE
et al., Defendants and Appellants.
[1] Waters-Irrigation Districts-Contracts: Property and Water
Rights.-A contract between an irrigation district and the
United States by which the United States undertook to deliver
water for irrigation purposes from the Central Valley Project
to the district and to expend funds for the construction of a
distribution system within the district is ineffective where it
deprives landowners of the district of vested rights as members
of the class who are beneficiaries of the trust under which the
Gnited States acquired appropriative rights to domestic waters
of the state, deprives "large landowners" of rights to waters
for their lands in excess of 160 acres, grants the United
States the right to distribute water for irrigation at a price
without compliance with laws of the state relating to distribution of its domestic wateT, reserves to the United States the
right to determine at its own discretion whether to continue
distribution of water to the distriet and landowners after
termination of the contract, and fails or refuses to recognize
the debtor-creditor relationship of the parties for repayment
of costs of construction.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Waters, § 631, 638 et seq.; Am.Jur., Irrigation,
§ 83 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Waters, §§ 529, 538; [2] Waters,
§§ 164, 167; [3, 4, 6] Waters, § 171; [5, 7] Waters, § 176; [8-10]
Waters, § 538.
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[2] Id.-Appropriation-N otice Under Code: Uncompleted Appropriation.-The purpose of Civ. Code, § 1415 et seq., requiring
posting of notice of appropriation of water, was to afford a
more perfect protection of water rights than that provided by
the older method of taking some definite step to divert water
to beneficial use, and the incomplete right of an appropriator
of water who has posted the required notice, although not yet
a title, is an interest in the realty which may be protected.
[3] !d.-Appropriation-Water Commission Act-Procedure Under Act.-The filing of an application under the Water Commission Act of 1913 and existing provisions of the Water
Code is comparable and of like effect to the posting and
recording of notice or commencement of actual construction
work under the rules which previously prevailed.
[4] !d.-Appropriation-Water Commission Act-Procedure Under Act.-The issuance of a permit following application for a
permit to appropriate water does not confer on the permittee
a fully protected right (Wat. Code, §§ 1450, 1455); the final
procedural step in perfecting a water right is the issuance of a
license as prescribed in W at. Code, §§ 1600-1677).
[5] !d.-Appropriation-Beneficial Use as Limit of Right.-The
real basis, measure and limit of the appropriative right to
water is the actual beneficial use of the water. (W at. Code,
§ 1240.)
[6] !d.-Appropriation-Water Commission Act-Procedure Under Act.-Neither an irrigation district nor any other applicant acquired a vested right to a permanent supply of water
appurtenant to lands of the district by the mere filing of
applications for appropriation of water of a river; such right
as was acquired was inchoate and incomplete and subject to
defeasance on failure to perfect it in accordance with law.
[7] !d.-Appropriation-Extent and Scope of Right.-Under
Const., art. XIV, § 1, providing that the use of all waters
"appropriated . . . for sale, rental or distribution is hereby
declared to be a public use," a landowner cannot establish an
outright private ownership of waters appropriated for such
use.
[8] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Property and Water Rights.-A
landowner within an irrigation district does not possess as a
part of his freehold estate a proportionate ownership in assets
of the district.
[9] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Property and Water Rights.-Owners of lands which were once within an irrigation district and
[2] See Cal.Jur., Waters, § 257 et seq.
[3] See Cal.Jur., Waters, § 279 et seq.
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later properly excluded are not possessed of rights to water
of the district which theretofore attached to their lands.

[10] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Property and Water Rights.-The
trust under which water rights and other property of an
irrigation district is held by the district is for the benefit
of a particular class of individuals, namely, the landowners of
the district as equitable owners, and individual members within that class can demand services to which they are entitled if
and as long as they qualify as members of that class.

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Madera County. Benjamin C. Jones, Judge.* Modified and
affirmed.
Proceeding by an irrigation district to obtain confirmation
of a contract entered into by it with the United States, by
which the United States undertook to deliver water from the
Central Valley Project to the district and to expend funds
for the construction of a distribution system within the district. Judgment for objecting defendants, modified and
affirmed.
David E. Peckinpah, Denver C. Peckinpah, Harold M.
Child and L. N. Barber for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, B. Abbott Goldberg
and Adolphus Moscovitz, Deputy Attorneys General, Henry
Holsinger, Principal Attorney, Division of Water Resources,
and Gavin M. Craig, Senior Attorney, for Defendants and
Appellants.
Roy A. Gustafson, District Attorney (Ventura), James E.
Dixon, Deputy District Attorney, .J. Lee Rankin, Solicitor
General of the United States, Perry \V. Morton, Assistant Attorney General, David R. Warner and Roger P. Marquis,
Attorneys, Department of .T ustiee, t as Amiei Curiae on brhalf
of Appellants.
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
tReporter's Note: The attorneys for the Federal Department of Justice participated in the trial comt proceedings as Amici Curiae on behalf
of the plaintiff district. They filed no briefs and dirl not otherwisP
participate on appeal except that as Amici Curiae they fikd a memorandum in support of the petition for a rehearing.
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Harry W. Horton, Horton & Knox, Denslow Green, Green,
Green & Plumley, Chester R. A~ndrews, Mason A. Bailey,
Coffee & Wolfe, Dowell & Thompson, Sherwood Green and
Green, Green & Bartow for Respondents.
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, Herman Phleger, Alvin J.
Rockwell and John M. Naff, Jr., as Amici Curiae on behalf of
Respondents.
SHENK, J.-This is an appeal by the plaintiff Madera
Irrigation District and certain of the defendants from a
judgment refusing to confirm a proposed contract between
the United States, acting by and through the Bureau of
Reclamation of the Department of the Interior, and the
plaintiff district. The contract is substantially the same as
that considered in the companion case of Ivanhoe hr. Dist.
v. All Parties, ante, p. 597 [306 P.2d 824], this day decided. Except as to certain matters hereinafter referred
to the issues are also the same as in that case.
As in the Ivanhoe contract the United States undertook
to deliver water for irrigation purposes from the Central
Valley Project to the district and to expend funds for the
construction of a distribution system within the district.
'rhis proceeding, also an in rem special proceeding to obtain
the confirmation of the proposed contract, was brought by
the district pursuant to the provisions of sections 22670 et seq.
and section 23225 of the Water Code. The federal law
(Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926, § 46, 44 Stats. 649, 650,
43 U.S.O. § 423e, Federal Reclamation Laws Ann. 318-319)
and article 36 of the contract require the validity or invalidity thereof to be determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction. The contract in question was entered into on
May 14, 1951, by the district acting under the Irrigation
District Federal Cooperation Law. (Wat. Code, §§ 23175
et seq.) On the 26th of March, 1951, the California Distriets
Securities Commission, with reservations, approved the contract (Wat. Code, §§ 23222, 24253), and the electors of the
district subsequently approved it by a vote of 1979 to 755
(Wat. Code, §§ 23220. 23221, 21925-21935). The district
commenced this proceeding on the 21st day of May, 1951.
Eighty-six landowners within the district, and four landowners outside of the district filed answers in which they
opposed the confirmation of the contract. The State of California and the Water Project Authority of the State of
California, by and through the attorney general, filed a joint
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ansvver. The state prayed that the contract be vali(lated and
a separate prayer recited that tile Water Project Authority
"is not taking any position upon the validity of the contract"
and requested the court to declare that its decree "does not
pnrport to be an adjudication of the right or interest of the
State of California or its agencies . . . or of the right or
interest of the United States or its agencies . . . in or to
1he water or water rights ... involved in the Central Valley
Project.''
Aft('r the
time for filing an answer had expired,
h'ave of thl' court was granted the State Engineer of the State
of California, aeting in his capacity as such and ex-officio
as Chief of the Division of Water Resources, Department of
Public \Yorks, to file a separate answer by counsel for the
Division of \Yater Resources. The State Engineer took no
position as to the validity of the contract, stating that his
objeet was to proteet the state law relating to water use
and control. Regional counsel for the Bureau of Reclamation
of the Department of the Interior were granted leave by the
court to appear as amici curiae and as such participated
throughout the proceedings in the trial court in support of
the confirmation of the contract.
Judgment was ordered in favor of the objecting defendants
and the court specifically directed that findings of fact and
conclusions of law be prepared in accordance with the views
of the same court in the Ivanhoe case. However, additional
findings and conclusions hereinafter referred to were made
on issues not involved in the Ivanhoe case. The judgment
included injunctive provisions similar to those in the Ivanhoe
case except that it expressly provided that "The delivery of
water by the United States to the plaintiff District at charges
not to exceed $3.50 per acre foot for Class 1 water and $1.50
per acre foot for Class 2 water, and the collection of funds
therefor, and the payment for the costs thereof by plaintiff
district to the United States is not enjoined."
The appellants are the State of California represented by
the attorney general who seeks a reversal of the judgment,
the plaintiff district which seeks a reversal, and the State
Engineer as Chief of the Division of Water Resources of the
Department of Public \Vorks who asserts the invalidity of
the contract but contends that the trial court erred in a
determination that a right to the use of water is acquired
by duly filing an application to appropriate water without
perfecting it. The respondents, who seek an affirmance of the
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judgment, are supported by the Di Giorgio Fruit Corporation
as amicus curiae. The Ventura County Flood Control District has appeared as amicus curiae in support of the appellants and seeks to establish that the trial court's determination
that water rights involved have become appurtenant to the
lands upon which water is being or is to be used is not in
accordance with existing law.
The Madera Irrigation District is located in Madera County.
It now has an area of approximately 112,000 acres, of which
about 85,000 acres have been developed for irrigation. Before project water became available 90 per cent of the acreage
irrigated was supplied with water pumped from an underground water supply. During the 25-year period from 1922
through 1946 the demand on that supply exceeded the natural
supply by an average of 27,200 acre feet annually and resulted in a net lowering of the water table by 21.7 feet. The
need of a supplemental supply of water was thus apparent.
Shortly after its organization the district in 1920 developed
preliminary plans for the construction of a storage dam on
the San Joaquin River near Friant and a canal to deliver
water stored therein to lands within the district. It acquired
a suitable dam site and gravel needed in the construction.
It filed applications with the Division of Water Resources to
appropriate unappropriated water of the San Joaquin River.
Plans for construction of the dam were never completed by
the district apparently because litigation between Miller and
Lux and the Madera Irrigation District established that there
was insufficient unappropriated water in the San Joaquin
River to sustain the proposed project.
In May, 1939, the district entered into a contract with
the United States whereby it transferred its dam site, gravel
lands and applications to the United States for use in connection with the Central Valley Project. In exchange the
district received $300,000 and a permanent priority right to
contract for an annual supply of water from the project.
Part A of the contract now under consideration is in partial
recognition of that right.
The contract in Part A provides for a designated water
supply for the district from the Friant Dam and the Madera
Canal for a period of 40 years, commencing with the year in
which the initial delivery date occurs. The United States
agrees to furnish to the district, and the district agrees to
accept and pay for the water supplied at rates whose maximum limits are fixed by the contract. Part B of the contract
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provides that, to the extent that funds may be available by
appropriation, the United States will construct a distribution
system to cost not exceeding $8,320,000. The system will be
constructed so as to provide facilities for the delivery of
water from the Madera Canal to each unit of irrigable land
within the district, each unit in no event to comprise more
than 160 acres of land. The district agrees to convey to the
United States without coRt the unencumbered fee simple title
to any land owned by the district, or perpetual easements
therein, required for right of way purposes for the distribution
system. Title to all the project works, including the distribution system, is to be and remain in the name of the
United States until otherwise provided for by the Congress,
notwithstanding the transfer of any such works to the district
for operation and maintenance. The district must repay
to the United States the actual cost of the distribution system.
The obligation is to be paid in 40 successive, equal annual
installments, the first of which shall become due in the year
following a two-year development period after the year in
which the system shall become available for use. At the
commencement of the development period the district will
take over and at its own expense operate and maintain the
distribution system, subject to the right of the United States
to take possession of the system upon the failure of the district to perform its contractual obligations.
The above provisions of the contract with reference to
cost, work, land limitation and payment by the district are
substantially the same as those in the Ivanhoe contract.
There are, however, two additional provisions in the contract here involved which recognize and modify the terms
of the 1939 contract, by which the district conveyed the
Friant Dam site and other interests to the United States.
Article 2 of the present contract modifies and adjusts the
amount of water to which the district might have asesrted a
priority right under the 1939 contract, and article 4 states
that the present contract is in satisfaction of this right only
for its 40-year term, after which it may be extended, as
distinguished from the Ivanhoe contract wherein the United
States did not undertake to supply water beyond the 40-year
term of the contract.
[1] For reasons stated in the Ivanhoe ease the contract
in the present case is ineffective in tl1at it purports to deprive the landowners of the plaintiff district of vested rights
as members of the class who are the beneficiaries of the trust
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under which the United States acquired appropriative rights
to the domestic waters of this state; in that it seeks to
deprive so-called "large landowners" of rights to waters
for their lands in excess of 160 acres although such landowners
arc qualified members of the class who are the beneficiaries
under the declared trust, and who are denied thereby due
process and equal proteetion of the laws; in that it, by implication or otherwise, purports to grant to the United States
the right to distribute \Yater for irrigation at a price without
compliance with the laws of this state relating to the distribution of its domestic water; in that it, or to the extent
that it, by implication or otherwise, reserves to the United
States the right to determine at its own discretion whether
to continue the distribution of water to the plaintiff district
and landowners therein after the termination of the present
contract, and in that it by implication or otherwise fails or
refuses to recognize the debtor-creditor relationship of the
parties for repayment of costs of construction of the storage
and distribution system.
In addition to the foregoing there are other issues which
are not included within the determinations in the Ivanhoe
ease. The first of these relates to the nature of rights which
accrue by the filing of an application to appropriate water,
and particularly whether the district and its landowners have
additional rights arising from the district's applications
for the appropriation of water on the San Joaquin River
at the time it contemplated construction of a dam at Friant.
The applications, filed in the 1920's, were never perfected; no
works pursuant thereto were ever built, no water was ever
diverted, and no permit or license was ever obtained.
As a part of its judgment the trial court in several instances held that an application for the appropriation of unappropriated water from a particular source resulted in a
vested right in the applicants to a permanent supply of
water from that source. In the Ivanhoe case it was concluded that the rights acquired under an application by the
state or its assignee or by the United States to appropriate
the domestic waters of the state for a beneficial use did not
confer a vested right in the persons for whose benefit the
application was made in the sense that such right became a
part and parcel of the freehold estate. It is contended
by the State Engineer in the present case that the right created
by the application itself is an incomplete, incipient and con-
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ditional right in and to the water applied for. With this
contention we agree.
Prior to legislation upon the subject, no priority of right
to the use of water could be acquired in advance of the
taking of the first definite step to divert water to beneficial
use. \Vhen work was finally completed and the water applied
to beneficial use, a right vested in and to the use of the
water which "related back" for priority to the time when the
claim was made, the location was selected, and work was commenced looking toward the conveyance of a definite amount
of water from a definite source to the place of its intended
use. (Nevada etc. Co. v. Kidd, 37 Cal. 282; Osgood v. El
Dorado Water & Mining Co., 56 Cal. 571.) From the time
of the commencement of the work to the time of beneficial
use the right was considered as incipient and conditional.
The provisions of the Civil Code enacted in 1872 were substantially declaratory of the rules laid down in the early
decisions. (Civ. Code, §§ 1414-1421.) [2] In Inyo Consol.
Water Co. v. Jess, 161 Cal. 516, the court declared at page 520
[119 P. 934] that the purpose of the code sections was "to afford a more perfect protection for such rights and to facilitate
the subsequent acquisition of the title to the use. Previously,
the incomplete right could be acquired only by some open, visible work to that end, upon the ground, accompanied by a declaration of the intent. Disputes would naturally arise as to priority between different diversions from the same stream at
places far apart. The code endeavors to avoid this by providing for the posting of a notice at the proposed dam, and
declaring that such notice secures a prior right, without any
work, for the period of 60 days thereafter. (Wells v. Mantes,
99 Cal. 586 [34 P. 324].) Thus there is given that which
it is said did not exist before (Kelly v. Natoma Water Co.,
6 Cal. 105), a constructive right to the use of water, a right
existing only by publicly declared intent, and which may
be made a perfect and complete title, as against all except
prior users and riparian owners, by beginning the work within
sixty days, diligently prosecuting it to completion, and thereupon actually using the water. This incomplete right, although not as yet a title, is an interest in the realty." (See
also Merritt v. City of Los Angeles, 162 Cal. 47 [120 P.1064].)
[3] The Water Commission Act of 1913 and the existing
provisions of the \Vater Code changed the mechanics of the
procedure for initiating and completing an appropriation of
water, but they do not change the attributes of the water rights
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acquired thereunder. 'l'he filing of an application under the
present law is comparable and of like effect to the posting
and recording of notice or commencement of actual construction work under the rules which had previously prevailed.
In Y1tba River Power Co. v. Nevada lrr. Dist., 207 Cal. 521
[279 P. 128], the court had before it the character of the
water rights acquired under the \Vater Commission Act.
In speaking of Inyo Consol. Water Co. v. Jess, and Merritt
v. City of Los Angeles, it is stated in the Yuba River Power
Company case that, "\Ve cannot distinguish these cases from
the situation before us. The right being protected and administered is the same. A period of priority was provided,
and the protection given there was during such statutory
period and prior to any actual construction of diversion
works." Under the facts appearing in the Yuba River Power
Company case the plaintiff was entitled to the issuance of a
permit, although his rights were as yet unperfected. It was
held that he had a right protected from impairment by
other claimants, although his right was as yet incomplete
and conditional. There is nothing in the Yuba City Power
Company case to indicate that it stands for the proposition
that the \Vater Commission Act conferred upon an applicant
thereunder a greater right than had previously been conferred upon one who filed notice under the former rules.
The Water Code provides that the effect of filing an application confers, for all practical purposes, a priority only.
Section 1450 states: "Any application properly made gives to
the applicant a priority of right as of the date of the application until such application is approved or rejected. Such
priority continues only so long as the provisions of law and
the rules and regulations of the department are followed by
the applicant."
[4] The issuance of a permit following application still
does not confer upon the permittee a fully perfected right.
Section 1455 of the \Vater Code states: "The issuance of a
permit continues in effect the priority of right as of the date
of the application and gives the right to take and use the
amount of water specified in the permit until the issuance or
the refusal of issuance of a license for the use of water."
The final procedural step in perfecting a water right is the
issuance of a license as prescribed in sections 1600 through
1677 of the Water Code. [5] But the real basis, measure and
limit of the appropriative right is the actual beneficial use of
the water. This is inherent in the Constitutional Amendment
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of 1928 and in section 1240 of the Water Code, which provides:
''The appropriation must be for some useful or beneficial purpose, and when the appropriator or his successor in interest
ceases to use it for such a purpose the right ceases.''
[6] It appears from the foregoing that neither the Madera
Irrigation District nor any other applicant acquired a vested
right to a permanent supply of water appurtenant to the
lands of the district by the mere filing of applications for
the appropriation of water on the San Joaquin River. Such
right as was acquired was inchoate and incomplete and subject
to defeasance upon the failure to perfect it in accordance
with the law.
As noted, certain defendants appeared who were not
landowners in the plaintiff district. These defendants were
landowners within the district at the time the district contracted with the United States for the conveyance of the
Friant Dam site and other interests. It appears that subsequently on their own petition the lands of these defendants,
comprising some 19,500 acres, were excluded from the district;
that these landowners intended to form an independent irrigation district and sought to obtain from the plaintiff district
a proportionate share of the benefits under the 1939 contract,
particularly a share of the priority right to contract for
project ·water. Under the present contract the amount of
priority water to which the Madera Irrigation District was
entitled under the 1939 contract was reduced in proportion
to the reduction of acreage in the district since the 1939 contract. But the excluded landowners assert that the United
States has refused to confer upon them that reduced portion
of the priority right under the 1939 contract, and that to
refuse to do so constitutes a deprivation of property without
due process of law. Their claim >vas asserted as an additional
ground for the invalidity of the present contract, and the
trial court so held.
·whatever may be the rights of the excluded landowners
under the 1939 contract, it does not appear that they have
individual rights which may be asserted under the contract
sought to be validated or to any of the property or rights
held by the district. [7] Since 1879 the Constitution has
provided in srction 1, article XIV. that the use of all waters
"appropriated ... for sale, rental or distribution is hereby
declared to be a public use . . . . " No statement is there
made as to the appurtenance of such waters to the lands
involved. Under that section of the Constitution the use of
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waters involved in the present case is a public use. The
nature of the water right to which a landowner entitled to
service from an entity which has appropriated waters devoted to a public usc, has been the subject of prior litigation
in this state. In Leavitt v. Lassen Irr. Co. (1909), 157 Cal.
82 [106 P. 404, 29 L.R.A.N.S. 313], a landowner sought to
reserve to his private ownership a portion of waters he had
appropriated for a public use. In holding that he could
not establish an outright private ovvnership of waters appropriated for a public use, the court relied on the constitutional provision above set forth. It was stated at pages
89 and 90: "In McCrary v. Beaudry, 67 Cal. 120 [7 P. 264],
is contained the first statement of this court in construction
of the constitutional provision: '"Whenever water is appropriated for distribution and sale, the public has a right to use it,
that is, each member of the community, by paying the rate
fixed for supplying it, has a right to use a reasonable quantity
of it, in a reasonable manner.' And in the late case of
Hildreth v. Montecito Creek Water Co., 139 Cal. 22 [72 P.
395], it was said by Mr. ,Justice Shaw, speaking for the court
in Bank, in defining the public use declared by the constitution: 'In the ease of a public use, the beneficiaries do not
possess rights to the waters which are, in the ordinary sense,
private property. A public use 'must be for the general
public, or some portion of it, and not a use by or for particular
individuals, or for the benefit of certain estates.' (McQuillen
v. Hatton, 42 Ohio St. 202.) . . . The right of an individual
to a p11blic use of water is in the nature of a public right
possessed by reason of his stat1ts as a person of the class for
whose benefit the water is appropriated or dedicated. All
who enter the class may demand the use of the water, regardless of whether they have previously enjoyed it or not.' "
In Miller v. Railroad Com., 9 Cal.2d 190 [70 P.2d 164, 112
A.L.R. 221], in passing on the nature of the right held by one
entitled to participate in the distribution of irrigation water
devoted to a public use, the court stated at page 199: "This
right is simply a right of service, a right to be furnished
with water by the utility upon payment of the price, and not
a water right in the ordinary sense of 'a private freehold
interest in the freehold of the distributing company.' (GlennColttsa Irr. Dist. v. Paulson, S1tpra, 75 Cal.App. 57 [242 P.
494] .) "
[8] From the foregoing it is established that a landowner within an irrigation district does not possess as a
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part of his freehold estate a proportionate ownership in
assets of the district. The concept of ownership existing in
the relationship between a district and a landowner therein
was further considered in Jenison v. Redfield, 149 Cal. 500
[87 P. 62], wherein a landowner sought damages from the
district for refusing to deliver to him his pro rata share of
the district's water supply, which he proposed to use on land
owned by him outside the district. The court in denying relief
used the following language: "It is apparent that to sustain
the claim of plaintiff, it must be held that the effect of our
statutes relative to irrigation districts, is to make each owner
of land within a district the absolute owner of a proportionate share of the water of the district to which his land
entitles him, to do with as he sees fit . . . . It seems very
clear that such a conclusion would be opposed to the whole
plan or scheme of the legislation for irrigation districts, converting a district ... into a mere agency for the distribution
of its water to individuals for use by them outside the district for any purpose whatever. . . . Such a construction of
the provisions of the Irrigation Act entirely ignores the object
of its enactment."
[9] Although the above case dealt
with lands which never had been within a district, and the
present case with lands which were once within the plaintiff
district and later excluded, there is nothing in the law which
would justify the conclusion that the owners of properly
excluded lands were possessed of rights which attached to
their lands.
Nothing said herein is inconsistent with the cases which
hold that the members of an irrigation district are the beneficial owners of the water rights of the district. (Merchants
Nat. Bank v. Escondido Ir1·. Dist., 144 Cal. 329 [77 P. 937],
and cases there cited.) [10] The trust under which water
rights and other property of an irrigation district is held
by the district is for the benefit of a particular class of individuals. Those individuals are the equitable owners. Individual members within that class can demand services to
which they are entitled if they qualify and as long as they
qualify as members of that class.
Questions are raised as to the sufficiency of the notice of
election whereby the electors of the district were called upon
to approve or disapprove the proposed contract. The trial
court concluded that the contract was invalid for lack of
proper notice. (Wat. Code, § 23223.) These questions need
not be determined on this appeal for the reason that upon
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the submission of any further proposed contract to the voters
in the district, the alleged defects need not recur.
In accordance with the views expressed herein and in
Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. All Parties, ante, p. 597 [306 P.2d
824], the judgment is modified by striking therefrom (a)
that portion which holds that by the mere application for the
appropriation of water for a public use within the district
or by actual use by landowners in the district of water being
furnished by the United States pending negotiations for a
contract, the landowners of the district acquired a vested
right appurtenant to their lands entitling them to perpetual
service as a part of the freehold; (b) that portion which holds
that an individual landowner, a member of the class entitled
to the benefits of an irrigation district, acquires any permanent
right to such benefits appurtenant to his lands when he ceases
to be a member of that class; (c) those portions of the judgment which hold that the following provisions of the contract
designed to secure repayment of construction costs to the
United States are invalid: (1) that part withholding water
from lands in default of proper charges although the district
may not be in default as to the United States, (2) that part
reserving to the United States the right to repossess waste,
seepage and return flow which escapes or is discharged beyond the district boundaries, ( 3) that part limiting changes
in boundaries, consolidations, mergers and dissolutions during
the term of the contract and ( 4) that part subjecting all lands
vFithin the district to ad valorem taxes to defray charges imposed by the district.
As so modified the judgment is affirmed, the respondents
to recover costs on appeal.
Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
GIBSON, C. J., Dissenting.-For the reasons stated in my
dissenting opinion in Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. All Parties, ante,
p. 597 [306 P.2d 824], I would reverse the judgment.
Traynor, J., concurred.
CARTER, J., Dissenting.-This is a companion case to
Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. All Parties, ante, p. 597 [306 P.2d
824], and for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in
that case, I would reverse the judgment.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied February
19, 1957. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and 'fraynor, ,J., were of
the opinion that the petition should be granted.

